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This  chapter discusses Egor Anashkin’s miniseries Zuleikha Opens Her 
Eyes (Zuleikha otkryvaet glaza), which premiered on one of Russia’s state-
run federal tv channels, Russia-1 (Rossia-1), in April 2020. The series 
is an adaptation of Guzel’ Iakhina’s critically acclaimed novel of the 
same name published in 2015. In addition to the prime-time tv broad-
cast, the series appeared simultaneously on the Russia-1 YouTube chan-
nel. The series garnered record-high ratings among Russian tv viewers 
(Revizor 2020), and it also received high viewing numbers and praise 
on the Russia-1 YouTube channel. At the same time, the tv drama cre-
ated public outrage and controversy in the traditional and new media. 
Throughout April, Russian newspapers published hundreds of articles, 
including interviews with the series’ producers, director, leading actress, 
and the novel’s author. Other articles discussed the film’s reception and 
reactions of different social groups; similar discussions took place on tv 
and radio stations. The miniseries became a media event across the ideo-
logical spectrum in both pro-government and opposition media organi-
zations. At the same time, the series elicited polarized responses among 
Twitter and Facebook users. The online debates were then summarized 
and reprinted in the traditional media. Going back to these debates and 
analyzing the hype surrounding the series, this chapter attempts to an-
swer the following questions: Why did an unremarkable tv drama pro-
duce such an intense reaction among the Russian audience? Why did the 
series’ reception differ from the much more favorable reception of the 
novel? What current social trends do these debates reveal? 
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To address these questions, I will first discuss Iakhina’s original novel, 
since the cause of the controversy can be traced to its original plot. I will 
then talk about the changes that were introduced into the tv series — the 
changes that sharpened the novel’s reception and heightened the media 
outrage. Finally, I will try to comment on the current social trends indi-
cated by the series’ reception. 
The roots of the controversy
Iakhina’s debut novel attracted the attention of literary critics and 
achieved high ratings among readers. For the most part, it received con-
siderable critical acclaim, including the 2015 Bol’shaia kniga and Iasnaia 
Poliana Awards. Iakhina’s novel tells of Zuleikha, a young peasant wom-
an living in a Tatar village in the 1930s. Her well-off, abusive husband is 
murdered during an n k v d  raid on the village. Zuleikha is deported to 
Siberia as a member of the kulak class. Removed from her abusive family 
and the traditional Tatar village, Zuleikha’s experiences in the deporta-
tion settlement lead to her personal growth.1 She falls in love with the 
settlement’s commander, Ivan Ignatov. Her son, Iusuf, who is born in the 
settlement, is educated by the group of deported intellectuals. At the end 
of the novel, Ignatov gives Iusuf his name and identity, and Iusuf leaves 
Siberia to study painting in Leningrad. The novel’s plot led to the two ma-
jor lines of argument: Those over Tatar national identity and those over 
the Stalinist repressions. These discussions then reappeared, in a much 
more dramatic manner, following the release of the film. Certain produc-
tion choices caused additional outrage. Furthermore, the audience recep-
tion itself became the cause of additional commentary in the media. 
Except for some minor changes heightening its drama, such as the 
introduction of a love triangle for the main protagonists, the series close-
ly follows the plot of Iakhina’s novel. According to its critics, the series 
flattened the novel’s artistic elements, such as the convincing character 
development. Irina Petrovskaia (2020) describes the series as комикс о 
тяжелой судьбе закрепощенной женщины Востока, оказавшейся в 
аду сибирской ссылки.2 This simplification or flattening of the plot and 
1 The Gulag system included both labor camps and deportation settlements. Unlike 
the camps, the settlements had relatively fewer restrictions and labor requirements. 
2 “a comic strip about the difficult fate of a repressed woman of the Orient who goes 
through the hell of Siberian exile.”
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the film’s wide audience-reach meant that the potential for controversies 
already present in the novel’s plot was fully realized with the production 
of the series. 
Iakhina’s work belongs to the genre of a historical novel, where the life 
of an individual character is set against dramatic and traumatic histori-
cal events. In this respect, the novel is reminiscent of such Soviet clas-
sics as Mikhail Sholokhov’s Quiet Flows the Don, Vasilii Grossman’s Life 
and Fate, and Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago. These novels, too, were 
recently made into tv series; yet, none of these films caused the intense 
reaction produced by the adaptation of Iakhina’s novel. 
The discussion of Soviet history as depicted in the tv series occurred 
along the lines of the persistent conservative/liberal divide. Soviet his-
tory remains a highly contested subject in Russian cultural and political 
discourse, and it plays an outsized role in contemporary Russian culture. 
In his Warped Mourning, Alexander Etkind writes that “Political oppo-
nents in Russia differ most dramatically not in their understanding of 
economic reforms or international relations, but in their interpretations 
of history” (Etkind 2013, 10). The importance of history has only grown 
since Etkind’s book came out, and Soviet history has become increas-
ingly a site of active government intervention.3 Despite these state-pro-
moted efforts, Soviet history, and especially its traumatic aspects, remain 
one of the most divisive social topics. In Russia, conservative and liberal 
ideological camps are defined to a significant degree by their approach to 
and evaluation of Soviet history. On the one hand, Russian liberal elites 
see the Soviet past as a burden that has to be cast aside in order to move 
on to a democratic future, while conservative elites, on the other hand, 
“look back on the Soviet period as a golden era for Russia” (Gjerde 2011, 
150). Since 2014, Russian history, especially the history of World War i i, 
has acquired a central role in the Russian government’s discourses of na-
tional stability and security (Bækken & Due Enstad 2020, 343). At the 
same time, the government narratives of Stalinist repressions remain in-
consistent (Bækken & Due Enstad 2020, 343). The political elites refuse 
to choose sides in the public discussions of Stalinism (Malinova 2019, 
3 The government’s attempts to create a “usable Russian past” have attracted much 
attention from scholars. See, for example, Koposov (2011; 2018), Malinova (2019), 
Miller (2014), and Sherlock (2007).
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96). The lack of social consensus makes this historical period a sensitive 
and important topic for artistic expression and political debates. 
The question of non-Russian territories and identities is another un-
settled question in post-Soviet Russia (Protsyk & Harzl 2013, 1). The his-
tory of ethnic minorities in imperial Russia and the ussr  has rarely been 
addressed in the recent public discussions of the past.4 The post-Soviet 
resurgence of imperial preoccupations and the anxiety surrounding 
Russia’s territorial integrity have impeded the development of Russia’s 
own discourses on ethnic minorities (Protsyk & Harzl 2013, 3). As a re-
sult, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian culture remained 
largely unreceptive to the postcolonial theory that influenced Western 
scholarship and culture in the late twentieth century. Moreover, Russian 
intellectuals intensely dislike political correctness, associating this term 
with socialism and the Soviet legacy (Anisimova 2017, 1–2). Both the 
novel and the series intertwine the two contested issues of the Soviet past 
and Soviet imperial legacy; these two questions are, in turn, complicated 
by the gender dynamics of the narrative. The series adaptation raised ad-
ditional questions of authenticity, such as the representation of the origi-
nal novel, authentic depiction of a Tatar village, and correct depiction of 
the Soviet past.
Soviet modernity
The novel describes a particularly traumatic period in the Soviet past: 
the collectivization of 1930, the development of the Gulag camps and 
settlements, and massive deportations of the 1930s and 1940s. The au-
thor claimed that the novel’s events are loosely based on the biography of 
her ethnically Tatar grandmother, whose family was deported to Siberia. 
However, the majority of the plot’s details come from other personal ac-
counts and memoirs written by those dekulakized, deported or impris-
oned in the Gulag camps and settlements (Guzeva 2016). 
4 Telling in this respect is the censoring of Khusein Erkenov’s film, Ordered to For-
get (Prikazano zabyt’, 2014). The Russian Ministry of Culture prohibited the film’s 
distribution for public screening, arguing that its depiction of Chechen deportation 
and murder by the Soviet authorities in 1944 would cause ethnic unrest. Moreover, 
the government claimed that the historical events depicted in the film could not be 
verified — an argument that ran counter to the claims of the historical organization 
Memorial, who insisted on the authenticity of the film’s historical account (Kavkaz-
skii Uzel 2014).
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Iakhina’s novel represents an interesting combination of Soviet liter-
ary clichés and original elements.5 In the novel’s plot, the author relies 
on Soviet literary traditions, while complicating these traditions by the 
complexities of character development and linguistic experimentation. 
The novel’s language is expressive and cinematic, characterized by the 
focus on the characters’ movements and vivid descriptions of scenes. This 
cinematic quality might be related to Iakhina’s original intention to write 
a film script that later developed into a novel. The narrative often shifts 
to reflect the viewpoint of the main characters. It alternately takes up 
the perspectives of Zuleikha, Ivan Ignatov, and Iusuf. Each character has 
their limitations, and the difference between the reader’s knowledge and 
the character’s viewpoint forms a certain ironic distance. At the same 
time, the novel follows certain Soviet traditions of character transforma-
tion common in Socialist Realist literature and film. In its basic outline, 
the plot tells of a Tatar woman who leaves her repressive traditions for 
the love of a Russian communist officer. Mark Lipovetsky claims that 
Iakhina thematically and stylistically recycles Soviet literature (2016, 
191). Of course, the camp setting complicates the possibility of such a 
Socialist Realist reading, nevertheless, the Soviet narratives of assimila-
tion and modernization of an ethnic subject are clearly discernable in 
Iakhina’s novel and reappear in the film adaptation. 
The book approaches the traumatic aspects of Soviet history through 
the prism of redemption; it seems to suggest that while not everyone sur-
vives the camps, the experiences in the camps can be overcome and even 
lead to personal growth. Even the novel’s depiction of death is somewhat 
matter of fact, and this feature becomes even more pronounced as the 
plot progresses. For example, here is the description of the fate of the 
newly deported Greeks and Crimean Tatars:
Новый контингент оказался слабым на здоровье, горячая южная 
кровь плохо переносила сибирские морозы — в первые же холо-
да многие слегли с пневмонией […] зимой семрукское кладбище 
пополнилось пятью десятками могил. Басурмане, так похожие 
друг на друга смуглостью кожи, густотой бровей и курчавостью 
5 Galina Uzefovich (2015) tries to capture this paradox when she comments that the 
novel’s reader unsuccessfully tries to come to terms with its combination of the mi-
raculous and the entire absence of the miraculous. 
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волоса, хоронили сородичей по-разному: греки — сбивая из жер-
дей тощие деревянные кресты, татары — строгая на длинных 
бревнах заковыристые полумесяцы. И кресты, и бревна распо-
ложились на кладбище впритирку, тесными кривыми рядами, 
вперемежку с другими надгробиями. (Iakhina 2015, 209)6
Taking the viewpoint of Ignatov, the passage presents the deportees as an 
undistinguished collective and as a problem. 
In her reliance on a redemptive narrative, the author uses what, fol-
lowing Etkind, I would characterize as the “Solzhenitsyn line” in de-
picting the Gulag experience. Etkind contrasts the Gulag narratives of 
Shalamov and Solzhenitsyn. Whereas Solzhenitsyn sees the Gulag as 
a space of moral perseverance, Shalamov presents Gulag experience as 
meaningless suffering. According to Etkind, the two authors have differ-
ent approaches to the meaning of historical trauma: Shalamov does not 
see any redemption in the past, whereas Solzhenitsyn believes in a pos-
sibility of the past as redemptive sacrifice. “While Solzhenitsyn presented 
his experience of survival as a moral lesson for humankind, Shalamov 
steadfastly denied any value in the gulag experience” (Etkind 2013, 86). 
The contemporary official narratives attempt to present the camp expe-
riences as a redemptive and even patriotic sacrifice for the future of the 
motherland (Sniegon 2019, 132). 
While reducing the moral emphasis of Solzhenitsyn, Iakhina’s novel 
connects the camp experience to the narrative of personal perseverance 
and growth. The story of the novel’s three main characters, Zuleikha, 
the Red commander Ignatov, and Zuleikha’s son Iusuf, show personal 
growth and transformation through the experiences of life in the camps. 
One could even argue that the characters undergo a redemptive jour-
ney that would be incomplete without the Soviet penitentiary system. It 
is telling that, like the rest of the settlers, Ignatov is abandoned by the 
Soviet state and nearly dies with the rest of his contingent. Therefore the 
6 “The new contingent turned out to have weak health, their hot southern blood did not 
tolerate the Siberian frosts well. In the very first cold, many fell ill with pneumonia. 
In winter the Semruk cemetery was replenished with five dozen graves. The infidels, 
so similar to each other in their dark skin, thick eyebrows and curly hair, buried their 
relatives in different ways: the Greeks made skinny wooden crosses from poles, the 
Tatars strict crescents on long logs. Both crosses and logs were packed into the cem-
etery, in tight, crooked rows, interspersed with other tombstones.”
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book has a paradoxical view of Soviet modernity as both traumatic and 
progressive at the same time. Even the Gulag settlement is transformed at 
the end of the narrative from an almost unlivable place in an inhospitable 
climate to a normal, cozy town:
В поселке громко, людно — воскресенье. В распахнутых окнах 
дышат ветром свежие занавески, палисадники белеют жасми-
ном. Ватага крикливых пацанят гонит мяч, всаживает его в чин-
но шагающий отряд серых гусей — вожак шипит, стелет по земле 
длинную шею, кидается вперед, но из-под ворот уже летит, оглу-
шительно лая, пара мохнатых псов, шугает гусей прочь. Пахнет 
дымом, баней, свежеоструганным деревом, молоком, блинами. 
Где-то хрипло и нежно воркует патефон […] (Iakhina 2015, 203)7
The director reproduces the same small-town aesthetic in the series. 
Referring to the improbable lifestyle in the settlement, Petrovskaia 
(2020) ironically comments: 
Переселенцы, брошенные в сибирской тайге, оборванные, хо-
лодные и голодные, в одночасье возводят дивной красоты посе-
лок с уютными домиками, украшенными резными наличника-
ми. В часы досуга на танцплощадке перед клубом, освещенной 
гирляндой огней, ссыльные (как в фильме «Любовь и голуби») 
танцуют кадриль.8 
On a symbolic level, the redemption narrative is represented by the tale 
of the bird Simurgh that serves as the leitmotiv in both the book and 
7  “It’s loud and crowded in the town on Sunday. Freshly washed curtains breathe in the 
open windows, and the front gardens are white with jasmine. A gang of noisy boys 
chases a ball, drives it into a marching detachment of gray geese  — the leader hisses, 
spreads his long neck on the ground, and rushes forward, but a pair of shaggy dogs 
is already flying from under the gate, barking deafeningly, scaring the geese away. It 
smells of smoke, the bath house, freshly planed wood, milk, pancakes. Somewhere a 
gramophone coos hoarsely and gently […].”
8 “Ragged, cold, and hungry settlers, abandoned in the Siberian taiga, build overnight 
a wondrously beautiful village with cozy houses decorated with carved window 
frames. During the leisure hours the exiles (as in the movie Love and Doves) dance a 
square dance on the dance floor in front of the club, lit by a garland of lights.” Love 
and Doves is a classic, late Soviet film by Vladimir Menshov. 
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the film, as Zuleikha retells the tale to her son. This classic Persian tale 
tells of the different kinds of birds who undergo a harrowing journey in 
search of a mythical bird. At the end of their journey, only thirty birds 
survive; yet, they achieve transcendence and learn that they themselves 
represent Simurgh. In parallel to this tale, the thirty deportees, includ-
ing Commander Ignatov, survive the first winter in Siberia. The diversity 
of the birds parallels the ethnic and social diversity of the first settlers. 
Central to this idea of redemptive Soviet modernity is the book’s ap-
proach to the Soviet national project.
Contradictory Soviet international
Iakhina’s novel focuses on the most traumatic and paradoxical period in 
Soviet nationalities history, since during the 1930s national policies were 
actively promoted, while national groups and entire ethnic groups were 
deported or purged (Martin 2001, 22). A number of scholars point out 
the contradictions inherent in the Soviet approach to nationality policy. 
To describe these contradictions, Terry Martin famously introduced the 
term “affirmative action empire.” The ussr  was a paradoxical multi-eth-
nic state that combined incompatible policies and features: 
[…] an extraordinarily invasive, centralized, and violent state formal-
ly structured as a federation of sovereign nations; the successor state 
to the collapsed Russian empire that successfully reconquered most 
of its former national borderlands but then set out to systematically 
build and strengthen its non-Russian nations, even where they barely 
existed. (Martin 2001, 18–19) 
Moreover, the idea of liberation and emancipation was built into Soviet 
discourses on the Muslim East. Despite Soviet control over the ethnic 
republics and territories that resembled the control of other colonial 
powers, the ussr  also engaged in the discourses of anti-colonial libera-
tion — discourses that obscured the Soviet domination. The Soviet Union 
“understood itself as an emancipating state that ended the colonial ex-
ploitation of the former Russian colonies and helped the Muslim popula-
tions to attain development and modernization” (Kamper 2013, 5).
Iakhina addresses Soviet nationalities history in her depiction of col-
lectivization and ethnic deportations. Despite including this painful his-
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tory, the novel simultaneously creates the settlement as a kind of interna-
tional melting pot — a model of Soviet assimilation. Ignatov notices once 
that there are nineteen nationalities living in the settlement (Iakhina 
2015, 201). Here people of different nationalities unite in suffering, shar-
ing their experiences, contributing to the community’s survival, and 
achieving personal transformation. It is interesting that Iakhina empha-
sizes this reading in her interviews. For example, she stresses the novel’s 
universal quality in her interview to Radio Svoboda: 
Ведь когда действие романа переходит во вторую часть, там прак-
тически национального-то и не остается. Там остаются только 
люди очень разных национальностей, но при этом с них слета-
ет все наносное, все предрассудки, в том числе и национальные. 
Они остаются просто наедине друг с другом. Я писала о людях, а 
не о людях конкретной национальности. (Medvedev 2020)9
The novel places universal values over national characteristics, connect-
ing national and ethnic traditions to “prejudices.” For example, Zuleikha’s 
Muslim faith appears superficial, she mixes Islam with beliefs in goblins 
and spirits, and her faith gradually fades away in the settlements. 
An example of the novel’s emphasis on universal values is the up-
bringing of Zuleikha’s son, who learns his life lessons from many different 
people in the settlement, all representatives of different professions and 
nationalities within the settlement — a German doctor, a Jewish French 
teacher, a Russian painter, a Chuvash fisherman, and a Tatar mother. 
Zuleikha’s personal trajectory is similarly problematic from the per-
spective of ethnic identity politics. The novel predicates the protagonist’s 
personal growth on her removal from her native village. Her experienc-
es in the village are all negative. She appears completely oppressed by 
her husband’s family to the point of over-identifying with her oppres-
sors. Therefore, Zuleikha keeps repeating that her husband is good, even 
though the readers can clearly see that he is extremely abusive and she 
suspects that he plans to murder her at several points of the narrative. 
9 “Really when the novel moves to the second part, there is practically nothing national 
there. Only people of very different nationalities remain, but at the same time, they 
lose everything superficial, all prejudices, including national ones. They remain sim-
ply alone with each other. I wrote about people, not about people of a particular na-
tionality.”
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While the protagonist’s thoughts create an ironic distance between her 
and the reader, this simultaneously puts the reader into a superior posi-
tion of a modern, often Russian, subject contrasted to the archaic Tatar 
woman. 
The novel is quite brief in its depiction of the Tatar past and life ex-
periences. For example, there is no storyline about Zuleikha’s parents. It 
seems that she comes from a loving family that experienced some hard 
times or even tragedy. Because of this absence, the novel lacks an op-
posing positive depiction of Tatar identity. Moreover, the protagonist’s 
mindset, as well as her personal transformation become less convincing. 
Similarly undeveloped is the background of Zuleikha’s in-laws, and as a 
result, her husband and her mother-in-law appear as unrealistic mon-
sters — the othering that plays into an orientalist tradition. Zuleikha calls 
her mother-in-law “Upyrikha,” a word denoting a female vampire. This 
association is further confirmed by the conversation between her moth-
er-in-law and her husband, when it transpires that the two were suspect-
ed of surviving by eating their relatives during the famine: И слышишь, 
сынок? Мы их не ели. Мы их похоронили. Сами, без муллы, ночью 
[…] По кладбищам людоеды табунами ходили, чуть увидят свежую 
могилу — разроют и сожрут покойника. (Iakhina 2015, 27).10 This gro-
tesque imagery of the past demonizes not only Zuleikha’s in-laws but also 
the traditional Tatar village as a whole. 
The personal transformation of the protagonist, a young Tatar wom-
an, which occurs after her removal from the traditional village, acquires 
colonial undertones. Zuleikha gradually changes in the Siberian settle-
ment. She becomes a skilled hunter and a medical assistant, and acquires 
remarkable personal and physical strength. Western colonialism, as well 
as its Soviet variant, often relied on the discourses of traditional gen-
der oppression as its tool. For example, in early Soviet narratives about 
Central Asia, women’s liberation metonymically represented the libera-
tion of Central Asia by means of Soviet ideology (Massell 1974). Michael 
Kemper (2011, 2) argues that contemporary Russian discourses on the 
East follow Soviet paradigms, what he calls “Soviet Orientology.” Even 
today, issues of gender and sexual identity are used as reinforcements 
10 “And do you hear, son? We didn’t eat them. We buried them. We did it ourselves, with-
out a mullah, at night […] The cannibals walked in herds through the cemeteries, as 
soon as they saw a fresh grave, they would dig up and devour the deceased.” 
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of negative stereotypes about Muslims in both Russia and the West. In 
her reading of the novel and of the series’ gender politics the Tatar cul-
tural critic Nuriia Fatykhova (2020) remarks that one should not confuse 
feminism with the imperial celebration of a woman’s dislocation from 
her cultural and religious traditions. Fatykhova finds the love story be-
tween Zuleikha and Ignatov especially disturbing, since Ignatov repre-
sents both the colonial and ideological aspects of Stalinism. She explains 
that this love theme is not legitimate because “in Russia they never said 
who had been a criminal and who had been a victim. The authorities 
never apologized to the peoples of Russia, including Tatar women. And 
this love story is presented without any thought given to trauma” (Costa-
Kostirsky & Shcherbina 2020). For Fatykhova, the story is problematic, 
because the trauma of Stalinism has never been addressed, especially in 
the context of Stalinist ethnic policies. 
The association between the Russo-Soviet assimilation and moderni-
ty appears not only in the novel’s plot but also in the author’s interviews. 
For example, in describing Zuleikha’s story, Iakhina states: “If not for the 
circumstances that force her to enter the modern world, she would have 
gone on to live in what was essentially the Middle Ages” (Guzeva 2016). 
Here Iakhina seems to subscribe to the vision of Soviet modernization 
that still dominates contemporary Russian interpretation of the history 
of Russia’s ethnic peripheries. The plot’s general outline and the descrip-
tions of the Tatar village easily lend themselves to accusations of colonial 
and imperial cultural logic. 
The novel’s language also follows a particular move from Tatar to 
Russian or even European identity. Early parts of the novel include Tatar 
words that Iakhina explains in the appended glossary; the number of 
these words declines in the following parts, being replaced by Russian and 
even occasional French. The film adaptation further exacerbated this lin-
guistic peculiarity. The series did not use Tatar language even in the early 
village scenes. Only one Tatar word, son (ulym), appeared in the entire 
production (Costa-Kostirsky & Shcherbina 2020). This cultural aspect 
appears significant in the context where the cosmopolitan and centraliz-
ing role of the Russian language for Russia’s ethnic minorities and former 
Soviet republics remains an important concept for Russian intellectuals. 
For example, a famous Russian writer, Liudmila Ulitskaia, claims that 
the Russian language played a central cultural role in the ussr , since it 
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connected the remoter corners of the country to world culture (Ulitskaia 
2012, 63).11 This cosmopolitan understanding of Russian language and 
culture and, by extension, the Soviet experience is represented by the sto-
ryline concerning Zuleikha’s son, Iusuf, who gets his education in the 
Siberian settlement. Because the deportees belong to different social and 
ethnic backgrounds, he is able to learn from their diverse experiences. 
He receives exclusive attention from the members of the Leningrad intel-
ligentsia, who teach him painting, French, and humanist values. 
At the end of the novel, Iusuf decides to leave the Siberian town to 
study painting in Leningrad. Even the settlement’s commander contrib-
utes to Iusuf ’s fate as a future Soviet intellectual. As the son of a former 
kulak, Iusuf has no permission to leave the settlement, so Commander 
Ignatov forges his birth certificate and gives him his own name and back-
ground. The forged birth certificate now reads: Иосиф Игнатов, 1930 
года рождения. Мать: Зулейха Валиева, крестьянка. Отец: Иван 
Игна тов, красноармеец. (Iakhina 2015, 220).12 This renaming and vio-
lation of Stalinist laws finally unites Zuleikha and Ignatov. Ignatov be-
comes Iusuf ’s symbolic father, and the three turn into a new multi-ethnic 
Soviet family. In the same way, Iusuf ’s education fulfills the Soviet ideal 
of the transformation of an ethnic subject into a cosmopolitan Soviet in-
tellectual, even if this personal growth emphasizes the humanist rather 
than the ideological influence of Soviet culture. Yet, to achieve this uni-
versal subjectivity, Iusuf has to reject his Muslim and Tatar identity. It is 
significant that the novel is not open to imagining an alternative identity 
that incorporates Tatar roots. Thus, Iusuf is not influenced by the forms 
of ethnic art. 
From adaptation to controversy
In his study of Russian cinema of the 2000s, Stephen Norris argues that 
Russian historical blockbuster films have served as a space for debates 
about national history, and the Internet provides an important outlet 
for this historical contestation (Norris 2013, 315–16). The state played a 
prominent role in supporting the production of these historical block-
11 It is telling in this respect that Ulitskaia wrote the preface to Iakhina’s novel, and con-
nected the author to the great Soviet Russophone writers, such as Chingiz Aitmatov 
and Fazil’ Iskander. 
12 “Iosif Ignatov, year of birth 1930. Mother: Zuleikha Valieva, a peasant. Father: Ivan 
Ignatov, a Red Army soldier.”
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busters. Vika Kravtsova finds a similar political significance in the state’s 
promotion of Iakhina’s novel and the subsequent film (2020).13 The novel 
does not oppose either imperial ideology or the politics of historical rec-
onciliation. However, like the historical blockbusters, the series led to the 
probably unintended result of media and public outrage. The public re-
sponse and controversy created by Zuleikha surpassed the Internet reac-
tions to the historical blockbusters of the 2010s; none of these films led 
to similar outrage in the online and traditional media or generated thou-
sands of comments among Twitter and YouTube users.14 The fact that 
the series simultaneously appeared on prime-time television and online 
resulted in a much broader audience than the earlier films which were 
initially limited to Cineplex distribution. 
The miniseries was conceived by the channel Russia-1 as a high-
budget and high-quality production of the kind often based on literary 
classics and historical subjects. Among this kind of miniseries are Alek-
sandr Proshkin’s Doctor Zhivago (2006), Sergei Ursuliak’s Life and Fate 
(2012), Valerii Todorovskii’s The Thaw (2013), and Aleksandr Kott and 
Konstantin Statskii’s Trotskii (2017). The topic of national history unites 
these projects, however, none produced the kind of public reaction cre-
ated by Zuleikha. In the case of this tv production, the already contested 
Soviet past is complicated by the addition of the “nationality question.” 
The release of the series became a media event, where both the original 
novel and its adaptation produced a wide discussion which was repli-
cated across multiple platforms: social media, such as Youtube, Twitter, 
and Instagram, as well as the traditional print and broadcast media. The 
Tatar historian, Al’brit Bustaev, argues that the novel’s screening on a 
federal channel introduced the story into the ideological mainstream, 
therefore, giving Iakhina’s work a greater significance (Costa-Kostritsky 
& Shcherbina 2020). At the same time, the tv adaptation reduced the 
complexities of the plot and linguistic experimentation of the literary 
original, increasing the opportunities for controversy. Especially intense 
was the reaction of the Communist Party of Russia and other Stalinists, 
as well as the members of the Tatar community. The Communist Party 
of Russia demanded the immediate removal of the series. The accusation 
13 This support can be seen in the novel’s choice for a high-budget production on one of 
the main state channels. 
14 The first episode of the film collected 11,088 comments on YouTube.
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of defaming Soviet history made against the series is quite ironic, since, 
as I have shown in earlier discussion, the novel has a nuanced representa-
tion of Stalinist repressions; and the novel’s message of redemption and 
reconciliation did not change in the film. However, many commenters did 
not pay attention to the nuances of the plot. The mere mention of Stalin-
ist repressions was enough to provoke their condemnation. Moreover, the 
series introduced some new forms of historical representation that were 
absent from the novel; the production emphasizes Stalinist repressions not 
only through the depicted suffering of the dekulakized peasants but also 
through the voice-over that enumerates the events of the early 1930s. This 
voice-over is later attributed to Zuleikha’s already adult son, Iusuf, who re-
counts his mother’s and the country’s history. The series extended the his-
torical span of the original novel, ending the story in Khrushchev’s Thaw. 
Therefore, in the final episode, Zuleikha travels to Kazan to meet her son, 
now a famous painter, his wife, and their young daughter. The series then 
contrasts the Stalinist repressions to the cultural relaxation of the Thaw. 
The Communists’ demands to stop the broadcast of the series reflect a 
particular tendency in contemporary Russian culture: On the one hand, 
there is an awareness of Stalinist repressions. At the same time, a vo-
cal part of Russian society subscribes to a more and more rigid Stalinist 
myth that sees any public representations of negative descriptions of the 
Stalinist era as the tarnishing of Soviet history. While the official culture 
has a more nuanced, if contradictory, view of Stalinism, it similarly has 
a tendency to disregard negative aspects of Soviet history. As a result, 
Stalinists are often able to dominate the cultural debate and to control 
cultural monuments.15 They are also well represented in the Internet 
debates. According to Elena Perrier (Morenkova), Stalinists are gain-
ing more and more digital ground, and they appear more active and 
more highly mobilized than liberal civil society (2019, 164). Indeed, the 
YouTube and Twitter comments on the series were dominated by users 
who accused the film of being anti-Soviet.16 
Visualized on screen, certain details of the plot produced a strong au-
dience reaction; many viewers remarked on the violence of the Soviet 
authorities, such as the killing of the child who tried to run away from 
15 The most recent expression of this tendency is the removal of the memorial placards 
in the city of Tver.
16 Here I rely on qualitative analysis of online content. 
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the deportation train, and the drowning of the dilapidated barge with the 
imprisoned deportees. While these violent scenes appeared in the novel, 
they attracted more attention as a part of the tv production. Reflecting 
on these negative representations, Zakhar Prilepin called the series 
Russophobic (Borisova 2020). In general, Russophobia was one of the 
most common accusations against the film among patriotic Twitter users 
(Rosbalt Like 2020). This accusation of Russophobia becomes especially 
ironic in the context of the strong reaction from the Tatar community. 
Even the novel led to rather sharp criticism from Tatar readers. The 
plot’s colonial elements and their depiction in the series further pro-
voked negative responses among the Tatar audiences. Thus, even at the 
production stage, many Tatar actors refused to take part in the project 
(Mukhametova 2018). Following the film’s release, Russian Muslim re-
ligious leaders demanded an apology from the authors and producers of 
the series, because they were unhappy about a sex scene in the mosque 
and the fact that many of the secondary characters were named af-
ter contemporary Muslim religious leaders (Metsel’ 2020).17 Members 
of the Tatar parliament similarly demanded the banning of the series 
(Bronshtein 2020). This absence of sensitivity to Tatar culture in the tv 
production exposed the relative lack of representation of non-Russian 
ethnic identities in contemporary Russian media. Media coverage corre-
sponds to the broader sociocultural status of the Russian ethnic minori-
ties: During the ongoing processes of recentralization, ethnic regions lost 
many of their rights, especially in the sphere of language and education. 
From 2017, the titular languages of the r f  ethnic republics lost the status 
of obligatory subjects in schools, while the number of teaching hours has 
dropped significantly (Chapman 2020). In the 2020 amendments to the 
Russian constitution, there is a controversial amendment acknowledging 
the “special role” of ethnic Russians and Russian language in the forma-
tion of the Russian state. This amendment institutionalized the priority 
of Russian identity over non-Russian minority cultures. The discourses 
on ethnic differences are characterized by continuities with the Soviet or 
even pre-revolutionary traditions. The media representations often em-
phasize “perceptions of fixed, unchanging ethnic characteristics trans-
mitted from generation to generation” (Hutchings & Tolz 2015, 7). This 
17 Bustaev points out that the mosque that appears in the series has a deep cultural 
meaning for Tatar history (2020).
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focus on fixed and traditional ethnic identities corresponds to the ethnic 
politics of Iakhina’s novel and the subsequent series, where the protago-
nists have to discard their ethnic identities in order to become modern 
subjects. 
In addition to the questions of history and multiculturalism, the de-
bate surrounding the film is complicated by the gender dynamics, which 
became especially evident in the attacks on the series’ leading actress, 
Chulpan Khamatova, a well-known ethnically Tatar actress, who told 
of hate mail and abuse on social media (Pankina 2020). According to 
Khamatova, she was accused of “defiling the memory of [her] mother-
land. Meaning not only Tatarstan, but the history of modern Russia.” 
(Costa-Kostritsky & Shcherbina 2020). Khamatova found herself in the 
paradoxical status of an ethnically Tatar star with a close connection to 
the state with its centralizing policies. The liberal press also contributed 
to the debate, by accusing the majority of the series’ critics of Islamic 
fundamentalism and Stalinist views. 
The comments of Twitter users further reflected this social split: the 
viewers accused the film of being “propagandistic shit,” [«пропагандист-
ское дерьмо»]. Many users called the film anti-Soviet and Russophobic, 
accused it of blackening Soviet and Russian history, of national betray-
al, and of being a production of the State Department (Rudina 2020).18 
Other users stated that the film instigated hatred and was a “sabotage of 
Victory Day” (диверсия накануне Дня Победы). Tatar users described 
the film as colonial, anti-Tatar and anti-Muslim (Rudina 2020). The 
Twitter storm is well summarized by the following ironic comment of a 
Twitter user:
Зулейха… Лента просто рвёт и мечет. Сериал не понравился 
русским патриотам, так как он русофобский, коммунистам за то 
что антисоветский, татарам за то что татарофобский и осквер-
няет национальные традиции и семейный уклад, мусульманам 
за надругательство над исламской святыней (по оригинальной 
задумке авторов постельная сцена уполномоченных ОГПУ сни-
малась на полу закрытой мечети), ценителям прекрасного в ис-
кусстве за примитивные диалоги, посредственную игру и подбор 
18 For anonymity reasons, I cite Twitter comments reprinted in the article by Radio Svo-
boda. The traditional press, for example, Novaia Gazeta, Revizor, Rosbalt, and Radio 
Svoboda, summarized and widely discussed the social media comments on the series. 
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актеров и всякие киноляпы. Прямо заинтриговали. Посмотреть 
что ли? (Rudina 2020)19
The intensity of this debate suggests a certain intolerance in contempo-
rary Russian society. While the Internet and social media have a ten-
dency towards outrage, this trend is similarly cultivated by the official 
Russian media, where outrage and a combative tone have replaced genu-
ine engagement and freedom of expression. In her recent analysis, Vera 
Zvereva notices that the language of Russian officials in the media has 
“become so rich in street language, non-diplomatic idioms and elements 
of trolling that what officials say is no longer clearly distinguishable from 
the speeches of less respectable media actors.” (Zvereva 2020). The style 
of scandal and outrage dominates the official media channel and then 
reappears in communications online. In contemporary Russian society, 
discussions about artistic productions seem to play a more prominent 
role than in other cultures, due to the lack of “western-style parliamenta-
ry democracy and a strong ‘fourth estate’” and of “a public sphere united 
around consensual values” (Hutchings & Tolz 2015, 6). The intensity of 
the discussion surrounding the otherwise unremarkable miniseries il-
lustrates the absence of social and political discussion on such topics as 
the significance and ramification of the Soviet past, especially as it relates 
to the multi-ethnic experience. The Russian state is increasingly invested 
in constraining circuits of societal debate (Wengle, Monet & Olimpieva 
2018, 1000). These discussions do not take place in the traditional spaces 
of academia or the mainstream media; as a result, cultural products have 
to replace this absence in the public sphere.
Conclusion
While the multiple controversies surrounding the tv series illustrate 
the multi-dimensionality of contemporary Russian views on history and 
identity, the combative style of these debates is indicative of the preva-
19 “Zuleikha… The blogosphere has just exploded. The Russian patriots did not like the 
series as it is Russophobic, the communists for being anti-Soviet, the Tatars for being 
Tatarophobic and denigrating national traditions and family life, Muslims for des-
ecrating a mosque (according to the original idea of the authors the sex scene of the 
ogpu  officers was filmed on the floor of a closed mosque). The connoisseurs of fine 
art did not like the production for primitive dialogues, mediocre acting, the casting, 
and all sorts of bloopers. I am really intrigued. Should I watch it?”
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lence of the style of outrage in Russian public discourses. At the same 
time, the discussion of the series provided the opportunity to express 
opinions that seldom appear in print and social media. This was especial-
ly true of Tatar historical accounts. Fatykhova suggests that the discus-
sion became an opportunity to demonstrate the polyphony of contempo-
rary Russian society (2020). Zuleikha Opens Her Eyes was broadcast in 
prime time on one of the main federal tv channels and on YouTube. This 
broad distribution created a media event and a rare shared cultural mo-
ment that brought together diverse social groups and facilitated intense 
debate over unsettled social issues.
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